Seeing the Bigger Picture

One good decision by Joe Girardi and one bad decision by David Delucci did more today than turn a 3-0 Indians cruisefest into a tie game. They were microcosms of lessons teams and fans would be well-advised to understand.

With his Yankees, down by three with one out and the bases loaded in the sixth inning correctly Girardi diagnosed the situation as the critical moment of the game. Forget that more than a third of the contest lay ahead and focus instead on the opportunity before Girardi.

Weak at-bats against righty Jensen Lewis -- who had relieved Jeremy Sowers -- leave the Yankees down by three. A single reduces the lead by two-thirds. A rally gives New York the lead. Yankee bullpen superiority is moot if the Bombers fail to score, and this is likely to be their best chance.

The bottom of the order is up -- a Quadruple-A player answering to Morgan Ensberg's name and a back-up catcher swinging a rubber hose. Instead, Girardi goes to his bench, sending up Robinson Cano for Ensberg and Jorge Posada for the backstop named Gonzalez or Cabrera or Guttierez or something.

Replacing Ensberg with a second-baseman leaves someone playing out of position defensively. Inserting Posada leaves NY without any other option at catcher behind a 36-year-old and his ailing shoulder. But those are problems for a manager whose team is in the game. So Girardi plays the odds and sends up those two stars.

Cano strikes out, but Posada rips a tailing liner the opposite way that left-fielder Delucci completely misplays. Failing to recognize that the ball is coming off a left-handed bat, Delucci takes the wrong line, eliminating any chance that he might make the out. Then, with his team ahead by three and able to withstand a single, he dives, misses and allows the ball to squirt through to the wall, clearing the bases, tying the game and sending Posada, the go-ahead run, to third.

All this completes the pitching line for starter Jeremy Sowers, whose shutout becomes five plus innings of three-run ball thanks to the efforts of the bullpen -- or more accurately, the left-fielder.

So:
1. The key moment in the game is not necessarily in the eighth or ninth inning; it's whenever the pivot point occurs. If Joe Girardi appreciates that the sixth inning might be the right time to insert his best pinch hitter, why can't any manager figure out that it might also be the right time to insert his best reliever? If Mariano Rivera or Trevor Hoffman is your shutdown closer, which makes more sense, using him with the game on the line or in the ninth with a two-run lead? Or worse yet, eschewing his services at the critical moment and squandering any opportunity to take advantage of his skills?

Someday, this will be accepted wisdom. It will be considered so obvious as to be beyond debate. There may still be some ninth-inning specialists, but they will be guys who can't perform with men on base, not teams' best relievers, and they certainly won't command the big money. For that to happen, a courageous -- or perhaps desperate -- organization must implement the philosophy.

2. You have to look beyond a pitcher's basic stats, particularly won-loss record. With different relief pitching or defense, the exact same pitching performance accrues a win and five goose eggs to Sowers's credit. Instead his ERA for the day is over five and he gets a no-decision. The statheads have developed complex formulae for measuring pitchers, but they are impossible for a layperson to calculate, and still flawed. That's why when I evaluate a pitcher I consider a statistical gumbo of innings pitched, ERA and quality starts, and then season with contextual factors -- home park, defense and bullpen.