22 January 2014

Can Ben Revere Ride Into History?

For his three years and a cup of coffee in Major League Baseball, speedster Ben Revere has contributed some wins to his teams - first Minnesota and last year the Phillies. He's swiped 96 of 123 bases, batted .285 and reached base at a roughly average .324 clip.

Given roughly average glovework with plus footwork in the outfield, Revere would grade out to an above-average player except for one small issue:

Revere has come to the plate exactly 1400 times. He has fanned 136 of those, walked 73 and gotten himself plunked on five occasions. He has accumulated 326 hits, 45 of them doubles and triples. He has slapped four sacrifice flies. But he has never gone yard.

This is significant because, in the history of baseball, only seven non-pitchers with more at bats than Revere have finished their careers without a dinger. All of them played before the turn of the century, by which we now mean the century before the last one, led by Bill Holbert, a catcher and outfielder who lasted 13 seasons from 1876-1888 for the likes of Syracuse, Troy, the NY Metropolitans and the Brooklyn Bridegrooms. Holbert collected 2335 mostly fruitless at bats, posting a .208/.228/.232 career line, good for less than half the average output. How he hung around so long could only be explained by your dearly-departed great-great-grandfather.

The most recent career slapper with significant visits to the plate was Gil Torres, an infielder for three years with the wartime Washington Senators. His record comes with a double asterisk: he was a fill-in from 1944 to 1946 and he played for the Senators.

So Revere is in rarefied air. Three more years of this, followed by retirement, puts him at the top (bottom?) of the list. But in case he manages to smash one over the fence, or more likely blitz around the bases while his double ricochets around outfield walls, he still has opportunities to enter the record books.

First, Revere can challenge Tommy Thevenow, a shortstop mostly for the Cards, Phils and Pirates in his 15-year career culminating in 1938. In his breakout 1926 season, Thev blasted 15 doubles, five triples and a pair of unfortunate home run blemishes en route to a .254/.291/.311 line in 156 games. He never powered a four-bagger again, despite 3,347 more at bats, the longest unbroken string of staying in the park in history.

More recently, Indian and Giant second-sacker Duane Kuiper failed to remain yard-bound just once in his 3,754 plate appearances from 1974-85. Unlike all the aforementioned, Kuiper was not necessarily pinch-hit fodder. He coaxed 248 walks in his day and posted OBP over .330 four of the 10 seasons in which he played more than a handful of games. But he is the poster boy for modern slugging ineptitude to which Ben Revere can aspire. 

(Kuiper was also a paragon of pointlessness on the basepaths, to the point that his managers eventually forbid him from attempting to steal. In his first five seasons, he attempted 112 swipes and was returned to the dugout 64 times, a 43% success rate. In his next five seasons he lit out for the next base on just nine occasions, failing in six of them. For Revere to equal Kuiper's futility rate on the bases, he would have to run into outs his next 202 consecutive attempts. Bet the under.)

19 January 2014

Bold Prediction: Either New England or Denver Will Win!

Coming up next, expert analyst gives us his picks for the championship ga -- click!

Could anything be more futile and less edifying than this? Consider what knowledge must be willfully suspended in order to care about his prediction:

1. There are two games. Four teams. We all know who they are. Two of them will win. Either Seattle or San Francisco. Either Denver or New England. What can the analyst tell you that you don't know? That underdog Jacksonville is going to surprise everyone?
2. They are more-or-less evenly matched. So even the most insightful observer hasn't the foggiest idea who is going to win. No to put too fine a point on it: give the four choices to a mentally retarded seven-year-old and she would have exactly the same chance of being right as the "insider."
3. It's one game. The best team often doesn't win. So even if you know who's better, you don't know who will win.
4. Games rarely proceed as expected. All the knowledge in the world about what happened before has limited value now.
5. There are external variables that the prognosticator can't know in advance, like weather and injuries. If Tom Brady breaks his leg in the second quarter, do you suppose that might have an impact on the outcome?
6. He's constantly wrong. (Everyone is.) Publicly. And yet people still value his predictions.

Thank goodness for Baseball Prospectus podcasts.

18 January 2014

Arbitrosity: Why Craig Kimbrel Has No Chance of Getting His Nine Million

For three seasons, Craig Kimbrel is the greatest closer we've ever seen. Mariano Rivera's transcendence arose from his consistent greatness, but Rivera was never this dominant for three straight seasons.

How dominant? How about awe-inspiring? For three years and a 20-inning drive-by in 2010, Kimbrel is owns a 1.39 ERA with 15 whiffs per nine and a nearly 5-1 K/BB ratio. He's allowed a .155 batting average and a .243 on base percentage, and a home run about every 23 appearances. He's led the NL in saves all three years, converted 93% of his save opportunities the last two years, scored the Rookie of the Year award in 2011 and finished in the top 10 in Cy Young voting all three seasons despite facing one third as many batters as the starters he regularly out-polls.

Now in his first year of arbitration eligibility, Kimbrel is asking for $9 million. By nearly any baseball economics it's millions less than his full value. Fangraphs estimates he has provided the Braves with $42 million-worth of value for the low-low price of $1.664 million. 

Unfortunately for the 5'10" fireballer, the Braves have no obligation to even the balance sheet. Low early-career salaries are recompense for the massive investment teams make in players from the draft to MLB call-up. Kimbrel's first three seasons were spent compensating Atlanta for all the Minor League busts the ballclub is paying to float around its system.

Nor is the franchise obliged to offer him market wages. Teams are paying $10-$15 million for closers packing 40 saves. Measured another way, teams paid roughly $4.5 million per win against replacement last season, pegging Kimbrel at the same $10-15 million, depending on whose metrics you like best. (Fangraphs pegs his 2013 value at $11.1 million; Baseball-Reference at $13.5 million.) 

First year arbitration cases generally yield roughly 40% of market value. That explains why Atlanta brass has offered the greatest closer of all time (first three years only) "just" $6.55 million. They are saying that they value their closer at $16 million or so.

The difference between Kimbrel's $9 million request and the Braves' $6.55 million offer is the largest in percentage terms, by far, among the 39 cases headed towards arbitration. Kimbrel will have to convince an arbitrator either that he is a five-win pitcher despite throwing just 70 innings or that the value of a win against replacement has skyrocketed to $7 million.

Last year, not a single case went to arbitration. The arbitration proposals served as a foundation for settlements, avoiding what baseball executives, players and agents all agree is a disagreeable process in which the club must denigrate in writing their own highly-prized employee. But the chasm between player and team in this case does not suggest a middle ground. Unless Kimbrel agrees to something much closer to $7 million, or unless his agent and the team are a whisper apart on a multi-year deal, he's headed to an ugly and ultimately futile arbitration case.

After which he'll strike out the side.

12 January 2014

Letters To the Arbitrator

Dear Mr. Arbitrator,

Thank you so much for saving our franchise $24 million in 2014. We plan to use that money on a new starting pitcher. It will help us remain under the $189 million luxury tax threshold while staying competitive, which in turn will save us millions more in future years. 

Gratefully,
Brian Cashman
Bronx, NY

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Dear. Mr. Horowitz-san,

Your most admirable decision is most cherished, like chrysanthemum. Will add $3 million at least to the bids for my services in United States of America. Very sincerely good news that New York Yankees enter bidding aggressively, like Samurai warrior. Many appreciations for you.

Very sincerely yours.
Masahiro Tanaka
Rakuten, Japan 

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Dear Fred,

Appreciate the vindication. And not calling me to testify. You certainly stay on our arbitrators list.

Bud

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Dear Mr. Horowitz,
Whatever. 

Tony Clark
Executive Director, MLBPA

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Dear Mr. Arbitrator,
Way to go: you cost the bastard twenty-something million dollars! If I could have done that, I wouldn't have bothered drilling him with a fastball. Right on!

Ryan Dempster
Boston, MA

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Dear Mr. Horowitz, sir,
Although I won't be making an further comments about the adversity that I have had to face, I want to take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation for your work in diverting attention away from my situation. With the ghost of Alex Rodriguez hovering over every conversation, people will quickly forget that I made a mistake, which I have admitted. In fact, they will see that I bravely stepped forward and accepted my punishment while ARod self-righteously persisted in tilting at windmills. 

I'll be happy to take your questions.

With great respect,
Ryan Braun
Milwaukee, WI

10 January 2014

Let the Gnashing of Teeth Commence

Your guy didn't get into the Baseball Hall of Fame this year. He was the best player on your favorite team or he once signed an autograph for your kid when he didn't have to. Enlightened voters recognize how great he was but the majority has failed to achieve that exalted state. Or he's one of the greatest players of all time and you feel that the bellyaching about unproven drug use is utterly beside the point.

He didn't get elected by the Baseball Writers this year but he might next year, or the year after, or in 2016.

Or a guy you despise did get in. You hate him. He always killed your team. He cursed out your kid in a parking lot. He wasn't as good a player as that other guy who is still waiting.

Whatever the reason, you are taking it out on the Baseball Writers this year. They're a sclerotic old lot who get positions for life even if they haven't covered a game since Duffy Dyer's Expo season. Their ranks don't include broadcasters, meaning cantankerous Neanderthal Murray Chass has a vote, but Vin Scully does not. They couldn't find their way to enshrine seven or eight surefire Hall of Famers this year after failing to elect anyone last year. Let the gnashing of teeth commence.

At the risk of defending a generally incompetent lot, calm down. The selection committee, whoever they've been over the years, has done a pretty good job of honoring the worthy eventually and declining the rest. Who's the worst player elected in the last 40 years by the writers? (Not by the Veterans Committee, which has an execrable record of throwing the doors open for their friends.) Tony Perez? Andre Dawson? Kirby Puckett? Catfish Hunter? Bruce Sutter? There's a level of nitpicking there, no?

It's not like U.L. Washington earned a spot because of his unique toothpicking abilities. Within a couple of percentage points, the crowd wisdom, even of baseball writers, knows wheat from chaff.

Who is the best player definitively barred in the last generation? (Let's skip Mike Piazza, Mike Mussina, Curt Schilling and their ilk. They are still eligible for election.) Lou Whitaker? Bobby Grich? David Cone? 

The BBWAA sometimes takes a circuitous route, but they ultimately get it right 98% of the time. It's a standard we'd be thrilled to apply to government social programs (they'd all disappear), blog predictions and gas gauges. (But not to airplane flights.) Cell coverage is spotty and you have to reboot your computer a lot more than two percent of the time.

So cut the Hall some slack. The backlog will work itself out. Biggio and Bagwell will get in. The steroid guys are a complication whose code no one has yet cracked. And if they crash on Edgar Martinez or Tim Raines, well, we all have our blind spots. As Mets announcer Bob Murphy used to say, that's why they put erasers on pencils.

And in case you're wondering why Jack Morris ultimately fell short, consider this: To end his career with Morris's IP and ERA+, Kevin Appier would need to throw 1228 2/3 more innings with a 6.23 ERA. If you think Kevin Appier's career, with seven full seasons of well below-replacement level pitching added on, equals a Hall of Famer, then you have a right to be upset. But you wouldn't have the acumen of a baseball writer.

08 January 2014

Predicting the Future Is Easy. Getting It Right Is Hard.

The hip new toys in baseball analysis can magnify and sharpen our understanding of the game to levels of resolution we didn't know enough to dream about in the past. But they can't foretell changes in players' hearts, minds, eyes or habits. They can describe how unlikely an event is, but not whether unlikely event X is the unlikely event that will actually occur this year.

That's how the most advanced statistical models of the Predictolator, which ran 50,000 seasonal simulations, projected before the 2013 season got underway that the Angels, Blue Jays and Nationals would make the playoffs, that Washington would play in the World Series, that the Reds would win the NL Central, that the Red Sox and Pirates would lose more games than they won, that the Giants and White Sox would contend for playoff spots and that the Phils would have a better record than the Orioles. Back then, who could have argued?

Everything anyone could reasonably know in advance about the teams was factored in. The sharpest fielding independent pitching analysis, the most cutting-edge defensive efficiency metrics, the most newfangled catcher framing valuations, and the most atomized BABIP-affected hitting trends  -- all ingredients in this statistical bouillabaisse. And yet, the Boston projection was off by 17 wins.

How could anyone predict that Josh Hamilton would suddenly hit like Alexander Hamilton?  Or that Jeff Locke, who had pitched all of 51 innings with a 5.82 ERA in his career, would throw 166 innings of 10-7, 3.52 for Pittsburgh. Or that four-fifths of San Fransisco's vaunted rotation would blow up like a middle-school science project (ERA 30% worse than average). Or that the Yankees would go on the disabled list and stay there.

They couldn't project that four rookie hurlers would catapult St. Louis to 12 extra wins, or that everything going right in Pittsburgh would reduce the Pirates' losses by 19 and propel them into the playoffs. They were off by 15 games in their Cleveland projection because Indian catchers (31 home runs) and second basemen (33 home runs) hit like right fielders and their first four pen jockeys (2.77 ERA in 271 innings) turned out the lights.

Individuals eluded the grasp of the best minds too. Baseball Prospectus's PECOTA system pegged Roy Halladay for 12 wins in 183 innings with a 2.82 ERA. Ineffectiveness and injury led to a 4-5, 6.82 campaign and retirement. BP had known-commodity Max Scherzer at 12 wins, 184 strikeouts and a 3.84 ERA, a far cry from his Cy Young performance of 21 wins, 240 strikeouts and a 2.90 ERA.

In short, the best systems in the world are still just a little bit better than mere mortals at predicting the fickle movements of humans who throw and catch a round, white ball and smack it with a sitck. If you know a handful of broad rules -- for example, hitters gain power and lose speed as they age; lefty batters boost their homer totals in Yankee Stadium; a pitcher with a very low BABIP-against in year X is likely to regress in year X+1; -- you can predict player performance approximately as badly as the Predictolar. 

Or, you can just enjoy the surprises that the game doles out annually.

05 January 2014

The Eight-Man Rotation

"Too much of a good thing is . . . wonderful." --Mae West

One might eyeball the Red Sox rotation going into the 2014 season and consider trading one of their six quality starters for an outfield asset or an upgrade at third. But new research by Fangraphs' Jeff Sullivan suggests that this would be a bad idea.

You are officially discouraged from linking to his fine article because if you do there will be little reason to read this. Let's instead review his work on the fallacy of the five-man rotation and then draw the obvious conclusions.

First, a disclaimer: when you read the conclusions you're going to think they are so obvious they weren't worth the trouble. Everyone knows that pitchers get hurt or otherwise become ineffective, giving rise to the cliche that "you can never have too much pitching." Yet we all act as if his findings are unknown and focus all out attention on each team's starting five. You'll read many articles in fine publications during Spring Training about this team or that's fifth-starter competition, as if the battle is for an Olympic spot that's never relinquished.

Here's the upshot of the research: A quick and easy review of the five pitchers who made the most starts on each team reveals that the fill-ins amount, on average, to a whole other rotation spot. They averaged 32 starts and 170 innings per team. In other words, the average team uses the equivalent of six starters.

And that understates the issue. In many cases, the five hurlers with the most innings on a given team were not the five comprising the rotation on April 1. For example, the Dodgers entered the season with a first-rate quintet of Clayton Kershaw, Zack Greinke, Hyun-jin Ryu, Chad Billingsly and Josh Beckett. Greinke sustained a separated shoulder in a fight, Billingsly lost the season to injury, Beckett to injury and general uselessness. They brought in Chris Capuano and Ted Lilly, but Capuano got hurt, requiring a parade of plug-ins until trading for Ricky Nolasco. L.A. got 101 starts out of their planned rotation and needed help for the other 61. Even then, a Plan C was required for 36 of the 61 they thought they had replaced.

Which brings us to the Red Sox. They feature a starting rotation of Jon Lester, John Lackey, Jake Peavey, Clay Bucholz, Felix Doubront and Ryan Dempter. Six square pegs and only five square holes. The obvious temptation is to swap out Dempster, the weak link in the group, to fill a hole elsewhere. Ah, but not so fast, grasshopper.

Consider how the Pirates made the playoffs last year. Their starting rotation made just 82 starts, 60 of them out of A.J. Burnett and Jeff Locke. Wandy Rodriguez was effective -- for all 63 innings he contributed. James MacDonald made six desultory starts and the Bucs invoked the mercy rule on Jonathan Sanchez after 13 tightly-packed frames that included seven jacks and 18 runs.

The aces of the staff turned out to be lefty back-up plan, Francisco Liriano (16-8, 3.02), and rookie call-up Gerrit Cole (10-7, 3.22). Another emergency starter, Charlie Morton, contributed 20 starts of 7-4, 3.26, while young reliever Jeanmar Gomez chipped in eight solid starts and ended up 3-0, 3.35. The Pirates coaxed 94 wins out of eight pitchers they had on the depth chart at season's commencement.

That's no guarantee that Boston will ever need Dempster to start this year. In 2012, the Cincinnati rotation made all but one start for the season. (The following season, Johnny Cueto, Homer Bailey, Mike Leake and Mat Latos all blew up. Only the indestructable Bronson Arroyo made every start in '13.) But that's the exception that proves the rule and is so unusual that the previous team to do likewise was the Curse-busting Sox of 2004.

Where does Boston stash Dempster if he's not going to start until needed? Conveniently, the same place the Cubs put him from '04-'07 when he came out of the pen to save 87 games. He's not closer material -- he wasn't then, for that matter -- but he can keep the arm loose in long relief while the rotation sorts itself out. Lester, Lackey and Bucholz are all well-acquainted with the Disabled List.

Dempster might not even be number six on the Fenway depth chart. He's contributed at roughly replacement-level the last two seasons and might be slotted behind some youngster(s) who can retire batters more efficiently. Where the 37-year-old Canadian might be able to contribute is by eating innings, which he accomplished 171 times without complaint last year. Anyway, there's not much market for an aging, replacement-level, $13 million, number-six starter. Whatever the Red Sox could squeeze out of a trade partner probably isn't worth the insurance he provides on the mound.

So, the research is clear: you can never have too much pitching. Teams need six starters -- at least.

01 January 2014

Another Spin in the Wayback Machine

In honor of the upcoming movie Mr. Peabody, based on the old-time cartoon in which an erudite dog schools a bespectacled youth on history via his time machine, we put our own thrusters in reverse and examine recent Braindrizzlings to see how the future turned out. Spoiler alert: objective analysis doesn't lie.

This January post unveiled a drizzle on Kyle Lohse's parade, casting his breakout 2012 (2.76 ERA in 211 innings, 3.76 K/BB, best year of his 12-year career) as a flash in the pan. Well. He experienced a second flash (3.35 in 199 innings, 3.42 K/BB, second best year of his 13-year career) in 2013. He's now produced 40% of his value in his past two seasons.

In this brief foray into March Madness, Oregon's indefensibly-low seeding in the NCAA tournament was paradoxically described as a boon to the Ducks and a travesty for their first-round opponent, Oklahoma State. Oregon blitzed the Cowboys en route to a Sweet 16 berth.

What must Adam Dunn have to bat to earn his roster spot? The answer from this early season post was .230. Sure enough, Dunn belted 34 homers and got aboard 32% of the time, but slotted in below replacement level because of a .219 batting average. A handful more hits would have raised the on base to 34% and the replacement value to black ink.

It was the same formula for Mark Reynolds, another Three True Outcomes star who walks less than Dunn but plays better defense. Reynolds hit .236 and delivered less than a win above replacement.

If the suggestion in this May post that the return of injured stars would catapult the Yankees into contention was slightly off-base it's because the premise was flawed. The stars didn't return as expected and the regression gerbils began nibbling at their replacements. 

There was no more regressing left for righty Joe Blanton, whom we pronounced cooked and served after an 0-6, 5.66 start. He actually improved over the rest of the season, which is all the sadder given his 2-14, 6.04 final record. Absorbing 180 hits and 29 home runs in 133 frames is the first step towards bar ownership back in Bowling Green.

The same post provided the rough draft on the obituary for Toronto's playoff hopes. The rationale, even that early in the season, rested on a lack of injury, bad luck, or other reversible factors for their slow demise. Small sample size be damned, the Jays captured the AL East cellar with 88 losses.

Here's one sure to elicit a chuckle: May 12 brought the assertion that the scrubs and stars Dodgers would not ascend to dominance unless someone not yet currently producing emerged as a star. Five regulars and Clayton Kershaw were booming but the rest of the team had less value than lunch at Sonic. It's doubtful this was the plan: three weeks later, a young Cuban named Puig and a former child star named Hanley joined the roster and lit rocket boosters under the team, driving them to the NLCS.

A week later, the first of several Shin-soo Choo homage sitings in this space proclaimed the Red Korean from non-Red Korea a beneficiary of the sabermetric movement. His modest lifetime averages (.293 BA, 18 HR and 73 RBI) would not have warranted much esteem from the baseball community 20 years ago, but today teams recognize his.389 OBP, base running proficiency and defensive flexibility. Sure enough, one Hot Stove League later, the Rangers bestowed their appreciation on Choo in the form of 130 million of their Texas-sized dollars.

So, with apologies to Kyle Lohse, calling 'em like we see 'em worked out pretty well, at least through the first third of the 2013 season. A peek back at June and beyond in a future post, when your attention span is rejuvenated.