The Truth About Seamheads

A visit to New York gave me an opportunity to watch the terrific Met TV broadcast team of Gary Cohen, Keith Hernandez and Ron Darling for the first time.

(Full disclosure: Cohen was a college broadcast partner and is a longtime friend. Darling was a subject of a couple of those broadcasts. My friend Mitch has a brother named Keith.)

They talk constantly of on base percentage. Hernandez stresses plate discipline. They seem to understand the massive role of luck. And yet even they -- Hernandez particularly -- (sorry, Mitch's brother) repeated constantly some old shibboleths about new analysis.

Here are some common misconceptions, some of which gained currency on the telecast I saw and others that I hear regularly.

1. "Moneyball" represents stat guys.

Moneyball was a book written by Michael Lewis (not Billy Beane) and a movie sort-of depicting the book. It's about the GM of the small-market A's exploiting inefficiencies in the baseball labor market, particularly with respect to on base percentage. Beyond that, the book and movie (which took the kinds of liberties with the facts that get new head football coaches fired) have no relationship with new baseball analytics.  Calling the work of new analysis "Moneyball" suggests ignorance right from the get-go.

2. Seamheads don't care about batting average.

Batting average is the apple in apple pie. The pie is on-base percentage, which includes other important ingredients, like walks, the crust of the pie.  Carlos Pena can bat .198 and have the same on base percentage as Ichiro, batting .320. In that case, batting average isn't very telling. But if Pena could hit .250, he'd be a star. When Ichiro hits .280, he's a scrub. You need the apples and the crust to make a good pie, and if you ignore the crust, you're not getting the full pie.

3. Stat guys don't like stolen bases.

How can anyone not like stolen bases? Moving a runner from first to second is precious. Stat guys don't like caught stealings. Giving up an out is way more precious. So if you're going to break for second, make sure you've first paid homage to the patron saint of thievery.

Beyond that, even stat guys realize that always playing by the book makes a team predictable, assuming the other team has the same book. (They do. It's on their Nook.) Teams have to bluff ocassionally lest they become transparent.

4. Sabermetricians think they have all the answers.

All the seamheads I read recognize that most of the game is invisible. Hell, R.A. Dickey is 10-1. Dodger backstop A.J. Ellis has a .436 on base percentage. Twins rookie Scott Diamond from Binghamton University has a 2.13 ERA and a 5-1 K/BB ratio. Who had that parlay?

5. The new analysts think the whole game can be reduced to numbers.

What new analysis has shown us is exactly what can and what can't be quantified. Many old schoolers believe RBIs demonstrate how "clutch" a player is. The new analysis proved that "clutchness" is hard to quantify, and however it might be, RBIs are completely unsuited to the task.
 
6. Stat dufuses (the plural of dufus) think they can measure fielding even when their conclusions are contradicted by observation.

Hidebound traditionalists don't realize when they are observing with their hearts. Sometimes the new defensive measures help us to see that. But in 2012, that area of research is still in its adolescence and should not be trusted with the car keys. Right now, the defensive metrics are a tool to help us check our work, but they can't completely replace our eyes, even with all our inherent bias.

7. Seamheads never played the game. They can't possibly know as much as guys who did.

You've obviously never listened to the profound insights of Rob Dibble. Why should a monosyllabic cretin with a live arm see the inner workings of the game more clearly than someone who studies it?

8. The stat goobers don't understand the value of team chemistry.

Maybe the traditionalists can quantify it for the rest of us. Maybe they can explain how the squabbling 1972 A's won the World Series. And then repeated in '73. While they're at it, they might want to do the same for Billy Martin's dysfunctional '77 Yankees and the same primadonnas under Bob Lemon in '78. Those '62 Mets and 2003 Tigers had more good chemistry than Brad Pitt's high school reunion. How'd that work out for them? (NY and Detroit, not the reunion.)

No workplace functions as well when employees prefer splenectomies to each other's company. I wouldn't sign Manny Ramirez to my team with Jamie Dimon's money. But chemistry doesn't replace talent. If you want Veteran Presence and Clubhouse Leadership, hire good coaches.

9. Even with all their numbers, the sabermetrics numbskulls aren't any better at predicting who will succed in the Majors than the teams themselves.

That's because the sabermetrics numbskulls and the teams are one and the same. Every team in the league uses sabermetrics (in addition to scouting) to evaluate talent and avoid losing ground to everyone else using sabermetrics.

10. SABR monkeys don't put much stock in saves, pitching wins, RBIs and other traditional statistics.

Whoops, that one's true. Research shows those statistics correlate poorly with what they are attempting to measure.

There are almost certainly more of these, but I'm on the way to a Met game.
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