An Epoch Ended in 2012 and We Might Not Have Noticed

In 2009, with the sting of the Killer Bees a mere pinprick and Roy Oswalt three years from MLB irrelevance, Astros GM Ed Wade signed a pair of middle relievers to hefty contracts and horded his aging stars in an effort to ... well ...field a respectable team, but not a contender. Predictably, the Farm atrophied and the team finished a combined 79 games under .500 from 2007-2011. When new ownership bought out the regrettable Drayton MacLane, nanoseconds passed before Wade was mercifully jettisoned.

And with Wade, went an epoch, never to be seen again.

Starting in 2012, God has bestowed the general manager position upon no more dolts or Luddites unable to discern what every other GM understands. There exists in 2016, no general manager, or VP of Baseball Operations, upon whom opposing clubs can giddily dump their problems. No one is as patently without a clue as Ed Wade anymore.

Every club in Major League Baseball employs an analytical department that complements the scouting department with statistical analysis, psychological profiling and who knows what else. There is no one left to get fleeced of, for example, a low batting average/high on base guy, because every team understands his value.

And the days when front offices debated the value of analytics is long gone. Every front office appreciates the competitive disadvantage attendant to knowing less than what a dozen websites (one one third-rate blogger from Charleston) know about players' true value. 

A decade ago, I could wring a column a week out of reviewing major transactions and identifying the patent lunacy of half of them. Signing a player after a good season without accounting for his ridiculously high BABIP. Valuing a pitcher with a nominally good W-L record without accounting for the conditions under which his team won. Spending money on declining veterans when it's time for a rebuild. And so on.

It just doesn't happen anymore.

Ironically, the last obviously head-scratching trade was made by the Grand Wizard of analytics himself, the guy who made his name bamboozling his counterparts a decade ago. Last winter, Billy Beane flipped star third-sacker Josh Donaldson, a seven-win player with five tools, for three-win third baseman Brett Lawrie and some spare parts.

All Donaldson did was win the MVP Award for a nine-win season in which he paced the league in total bases, runs scored, and RBIs while slugging 41 homers and 43 doubles/triples for Toronto while Lawrie backslid a win.

But even then, there might be extenuating circumstances. Lawrie is four years younger and can play other infield positions. Two nearly Major League-ready hurlers accompanied him to Oakland. And there were reports that Beane and Donaldson weren't gracefully co-existing.

The point is, the days of the doofus GM are over. Now even Billy Beane can get jobbed. And all I got out of it is one column.

Phinished Phillies Phacing a CatAstroPhe

Following their World Series appearance in 2005 (a sweep at the hands of the White Sox) management of the Houston Astros decided that denial would be an appropriate strategy for the future. 

So, acting as if Jeff Bagwell hadn't just retired, Craig Biggio hadn't turned to jelly at age 40 and the lineup's black holes (can you say Brad Ausmus and his 64 OPS+ in Houston?) didn't exist, management embarked on a concerted effort to be respectable over the next several years. They traded away many bits of their future to acquire post-prime veterans who could help them continue finishing around the middle of the pack.

The strategy worked -- to the extent that the team finished above .500 twice between '06 and '10 without ever losing 90 games, and Biggio retired an Astro with 3,000 hits on his resume.

Those results came at the expense of draft classes rated F, C and F by Baseball America, in part because Houston brass refused to invest in expensive signees. The Astros also passed up opportunities to trade valuable chips like Carlos Lee while they could still bring something of future value in return.

Inevitably, the team deteriorated and the future slipped past a distant horizon. After a 2011 season in which the team slipped to 106 losses, Jim Crane bought the franchise and fired GM Ed Wade and president Tal Smith. His new management team belatedly liquidated the talent en route to full-rebuild mode. Two more years of on-field misery have followed as the fans await the delayed emergence of a new crop of stars.

Philadelphia GM Ruben Amaro had to be watching all this but he was apparently not taking notes. Today, Amaro is mouthing Wade's words from the end of the Astros' relevance. With his aging and ailing Phils now a game under .500 over the last 18 months, Amaro has been heard contemplating whom he'll acquire for a stretch run and blaming Ryan Howard's declining performance on a lack of desire.

Many screens have been filled blasting Amaro for his blindness, stubbornness and/or disorinetation from reality, though I'm inclined to think it's more cognitive dissonance: he signed Howard, Utley, Rollins, et. al. to their untenable contracts and can't admit they've gone bad. The Phillies are in '09 Astros mode and have only two viable options: rebuild for the future now when they can get key pieces back for the future or wait a couple of years too long and fall into total disrepair.

Think about how much some of their antiques might fetch on the Baseball Roadshow. If they're willing to eat money, Philadelphia can flip Chase Utley, Michael Young and Cliff Lee  -- all 34 or over -- to contenders for significant returns of youth. Jimmy Rollins and Carlos Ruiz could net more modest benefits. Were Amaro to test the fans' limits, he could dangle All-Star closer Jonathan Papelbon before the likes of Detroit and watch them wet their pants. Who needs a closer when there's nothing to close?

The point here is that the Phils must recognize what's obvious -- they're not contending this year and they need to invest in the future. Mediocrity in defense of respectability is no virtue; extreme measures in pursuit of pennants is no vice.  The longer the Phillies wait to make that investment, the less they'll get for it.

A Road Map To More Success

Take a little trip down Hypothetical Lane with me, would you?

On Hypothetical Lane, the Tampa Bay Rays have a sublimely good team. Their entire young pitching corps is divine, their defense rock solid and their run scoring among the league's elite. Not only did they send away for the best record in baseball and a six-game lead in the game's toughest division, but they got the bonus secret decoder ring, also known as an historic run differential of nearly two-and-a-half per game. This stat can be squirrelly after just one-quarter of the season, but it tends to auger further success.

The weak spot in their starting quintet, second-year fireballer Wade Davis, has a 3.35 ERA and nearly eight strikeouts per nine. But the weak link in their lineup, their DH, which has no natural resident now that Pat Burrell's been evicted. Hank Blalock has been staffing the position since Burrell cleaned out his locker, but he's more of a stopgap measure.

Here's the worry we have on Hypothetical Lane. Our team is mighty young. Can this dream season last? Can they withstand the withering power of the mean gang from New York across the street? More to the point, can a team whose top two power hitters are Evan Longoria and no one, continue to manufacture runs like a stocking factory?

Now take a peek around the corner to Serendipity Street. Isn't that Lance Berkman, lallygagging with those ne'er-do-well Astro boys? Someone ought to grab that Lance and...hey, maybe the short-sighted manager of the store Lance works at, Mr. Wade, might be willing let him go for a song. He's costing Mr. Wade's boss $14 million a year and not exactly producing. Maybe Tampa could send over a nice inlet or cove, a third-rate pitching prospect from the Montgomery Biscuits or the Charlotte Stone Crabs and a couple of clues how to run a franchise in exchange for the big first baseman.

Over here on Rationale Avenue, I'll tell you why. First, we have to acknowledge that Houston has less intention of trading Roy Oswalt than of relocating to Waco. If owner Drayton McLane wanted to unload Oswalt he wouldn't have announced that Oswalt was asking out, sapping the team of any leverage it might have had. 

But Berkman hasn't made a peep, at least publicly, which means other teams don't know that Ed Wade has absolutely no options. Unfortunately for Wade, the only GM dumb enough not to figure that out anyway is Ed Wade, so he's going to have to flip Berkman -- about two years too late -- for about 20 cents on the dollar. The worst farm system in baseball could use a couple of prospects, which Tampa has in spades.

Here's the great thing about Berkman for Tampa. While he carries a hefty price tag, his contract expires in two years, when he'll be 36 and before most of the Rays hit free agency. They can make the investment now without bankrupting the franchise as the lineup ripens. If Berkman runs out of steam, he's only on the books through next season .

Moreover, Berkman is a hitting and walking machine who plays a mean first base. The Rays could shuttle Carlos Pena to DH and Blalock back to Durham, strengthening their lineup and adding depth simultaneously.

A team with two catchers who can hit, three reliable middle infielders, a shutdown bullpen and a manager who gets it, is living on Easy Street. A deal for Berkman -- eminently doable if Houston has any brains -- could shore up their one small weakness and place another barrier between them and the Evil Empire. Some other fire-sale All Star is coming to the Bronx before the trade deadline; why not offset that advantage in advance? The Rays should make the move now. The Astros, well, they should become Rays fans.

Which would push that number to about 14,000.

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