Remember when those statistics geeks dragged their pencil necks out of the ooze of their mothers' basements and dropped their complicated nerd numbers on us, numbers like OPS and WAR? They made unreasonable demands on us, like understanding obtuse concepts: "getting on base is good" and "hitting for power is more than home runs."
And then, just when we picked up the spin on those knuckleballs they were throwing us, they began firing heat, telling us OPS wasn't the end-all. No, it turns out we could gloat that they were wrong all along, those Moneyball pocket protectors. We know that science should make a pronouncement and that should be The Truth forever, without any revisions or further inquiry. So now when they decide that wOBA is a more useful statistic, they're just admitting they were wrong.
So now we have wOBA, weighted on base average, which "combines all the different aspects of hitting
into one metric, weighting each of them in proportion to their actual
run value. While batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging
percentage fall short in accuracy and scope, wOBA measures and captures
offensive value more accurately and comprehensively," according to Fangraphs.
OPS values slugging as equal to on base percentage, when in fact getting on base safely is nearly twice as important to a team's ability to score runs as slugging is. That's why OPS always over-rated the big lugs who walk, strikeout and go yard and under-rated skeeters who Baltimore-chop their way aboard, steal second and score on a sac fly.
wOBA is tuned to the pitch of average on-base percentage, or roughly .320. So if you see that Yan Gomes posted a wOBA of .340 last year, you know that the Indians' catcher was an above-average hitter. (He's also a quality backstop worth nearly five wins for the Tribe last year. He's an under-appreciated ballplayer.) Ordinary fans can't calculate wOBA because the formula is complicated and requires facility with the cosmic mysteries of multiplication and division.
For 2015, wOBA will be one of our go-to statistics for hitters. So will TAv, or True Average, a similar measurement scaled to batting average (where average is .260) that accounts for park factors and league quality, but not for baserunning. It is also beyond the derivation powers of ordinary humans without green eyeshades and solved Rubic's cube puzzles. Potato tomahto.
Sometimes we want total value wrapped up in a single package with a nice ribbon. WAR, wins above replacement, wins the Oscar for best performance in The Theory of Everything, flawed though its performance is. WAR includes a defensive component, which still inspires chuckling, but does compare players to others at their position. An average defender in right field with a .340 wOBA is not nearly as valuable as an average defender with a .340 wOBA behind the plate.
WAR is becoming more popular, and not just because the deformed brains of Boko Haram and Daesh are on rampages that inspire war in their corners of the world. WAR provides one-stop shopping for a player's tangible value to his team in games won, taking into account offense and defense, park factors, league averages and replacement value. And it's becoming ubiquitous, which hikes its value as a statistic, as long as it's consumed with a grain of salt even by those with high blood pressure.
Look for wOBA, TAv and WAr in this space to replace OPS and OPS+, which once upon a time replaced batting average, home runs and RBIs. It's called "learning." Don't tell Boko Haram.
Showing posts with label wOBA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label wOBA. Show all posts
14 March 2015
03 May 2014
Why A Single Is Half a Home Run
Max from Boston asks on behalf of his dad: It strikes us that slugging is measured inaccurately in that a double isn't necessarily worth twice a single, a triple isn't necessarily worth 50% more than a double, a homer may be worth more than 2 doubles, etc. Is there any data regarding the possible value of a weighted slugging pct.?
Is there any data? Ha! The pale-skinned basement-dwellers responsible for much of the sabermetric research over the last generation have trolled every piece of datum from all 400,000 MLB games played since 1876; analyzed each across 49 criteria; subjected them to 11 statistical tests, applied two dozen filters; pickled them in proprietary solutions for 48 hours, rolled them in flour, egg and bread crumbs and sauteed them on high heat until crispy and brown on the edges.
There is more known about shortstop Leo Cardenas' ability to go from first-to-third on a single for the Cincinnati Reds in 1967 than about Toronto mayor Rob Ford's whereabouts last Thursday. Is there any data!
In fact, Max has opened a window into what seamheads call linear weights, exactly the calculation that Max has outlined. With runners on first and second, a double scores two runs, just as a triple does. Leaving the yard produces three -- not four -- times as many runs as a single, and the single leaves a runner just 90 feet from home. So what is the relative value of these events?
Going for Third on A Double? Hardly Worth It
Denied girlfriends after years playing video games, the stubby-fingered geeks have instead focused their pursuits on sifting through every occurrence in baseball history and determined how often and how many runs have scored when these hits (and all other events like fly outs, strikeouts, HBP, errors, etc.) have been involved. These are the relative values, assigning a walk/HBP a vaue of one:
Single ~ 1.25
Double ~ 1.75
Triple ~ 2.25
HR ~ 2.75
Are you shocked that a homer is worth less than three walks and less than two-and-a-quarter singles? Part of the value of each of these accomplishments is in their ability to not cause an out, of which there are a finite number allotted each team per game.
And Now, To Actually Answer the Question
So back to slugging percentage. Clearly just adding up total bases to derive slugging percentage, and therefore OPS, glorifies yard barkers and diminishes the accomplishments of slap hitters. We documented this in March.
There are now better measures than slugging percentage and OPS that are defined by these linear weights. wOBA and True Average are one-stop shopping linear weights measurements of overall offensive performance that include park adjustments and other sanded edges, all rolled up into a number that looks like OBP (wOBA) or batting average (TAv). Here's an example of how wOBA can correct a misconception created by Max's slugging percentage discovery:
Last year, Adam Dunn produced an OPS 48% better than league average. That's awesome. But his wOBA was just .331 -- slightly better than average. Matt Carpenter, whose OPS was lower but whose hit distribution included many fewer home runs and many more singles, doubles (55) and triples (seven), produced a wOBA of .381.
In other words, OPS says Dunn was a great hitter last season and Carpenter a good one. wOBA shows us that Dunn was an above-average offensive performer while Carpenter was a downballot MVP candidate.
Is there any data? Ha! The pale-skinned basement-dwellers responsible for much of the sabermetric research over the last generation have trolled every piece of datum from all 400,000 MLB games played since 1876; analyzed each across 49 criteria; subjected them to 11 statistical tests, applied two dozen filters; pickled them in proprietary solutions for 48 hours, rolled them in flour, egg and bread crumbs and sauteed them on high heat until crispy and brown on the edges.
There is more known about shortstop Leo Cardenas' ability to go from first-to-third on a single for the Cincinnati Reds in 1967 than about Toronto mayor Rob Ford's whereabouts last Thursday. Is there any data!
In fact, Max has opened a window into what seamheads call linear weights, exactly the calculation that Max has outlined. With runners on first and second, a double scores two runs, just as a triple does. Leaving the yard produces three -- not four -- times as many runs as a single, and the single leaves a runner just 90 feet from home. So what is the relative value of these events?
Going for Third on A Double? Hardly Worth It
Denied girlfriends after years playing video games, the stubby-fingered geeks have instead focused their pursuits on sifting through every occurrence in baseball history and determined how often and how many runs have scored when these hits (and all other events like fly outs, strikeouts, HBP, errors, etc.) have been involved. These are the relative values, assigning a walk/HBP a vaue of one:
Single ~ 1.25
Double ~ 1.75
Triple ~ 2.25
HR ~ 2.75
Are you shocked that a homer is worth less than three walks and less than two-and-a-quarter singles? Part of the value of each of these accomplishments is in their ability to not cause an out, of which there are a finite number allotted each team per game.
And Now, To Actually Answer the Question
So back to slugging percentage. Clearly just adding up total bases to derive slugging percentage, and therefore OPS, glorifies yard barkers and diminishes the accomplishments of slap hitters. We documented this in March.
There are now better measures than slugging percentage and OPS that are defined by these linear weights. wOBA and True Average are one-stop shopping linear weights measurements of overall offensive performance that include park adjustments and other sanded edges, all rolled up into a number that looks like OBP (wOBA) or batting average (TAv). Here's an example of how wOBA can correct a misconception created by Max's slugging percentage discovery:
Last year, Adam Dunn produced an OPS 48% better than league average. That's awesome. But his wOBA was just .331 -- slightly better than average. Matt Carpenter, whose OPS was lower but whose hit distribution included many fewer home runs and many more singles, doubles (55) and triples (seven), produced a wOBA of .381.
In other words, OPS says Dunn was a great hitter last season and Carpenter a good one. wOBA shows us that Dunn was an above-average offensive performer while Carpenter was a downballot MVP candidate.
30 April 2014
Your Team Needs to Strike Out More
Do a web search on "2014 strikeouts" and you will find a parade of articles postulating about a jump in Ks this year.
"Seattle Mariners: Strikeout problem stalling offense"
"Where are all of the Johnny Cueto strikeouts coming from?"
"What's behind all those strikeouts for Joe Mauer?"
"Strikeouts galore for the 2014 Mets"
For the seventh consecutive year, the strikeout rate has risen in April, to more than one every five plate appearances. Roughly 16 batters whiff in an average nine-inning game.
Theorized reasons for this trend are myriad. Fastball velocity has risen over the years, from an average of 89.8 mph in 2008 to 91.4 mph this season, according to Beyond the Box Score. Chris Moran notes in this BTB article that 12 pitchers had averaged 94 mph in an April start last year. That number was 25 with half of April to go in 2014.
There are other factors as well. Batters are swinging more at balls outside the strike zone and less at pitches inside it. That may be due to improved catcher framing, which has become a subject of much more emphasis now that cameras are observing every pitch and recording the result. Analysis has discovered that catchers can alter a significant number of ball/strike calls in the course of a game because umps are more likely to call strikes on pitches caught by the catcher if he doesn't move to retrieve the throw.
From an aesthetic standpoint, most fans are not enamored of this development. Few people pay to see a lot of wind-making. From a strategic standpoint, it seems obvious that strikeouts are a negative event for the team at bat -- after all, they are outs. But in a more general sense, the evidence suggests that strikeouts are very necessary evils.
In fact, strikeouts are often a tradeoff. Batters who swing hard and wait for their pitch -- i.e., pass on pitches they don't like even if they're in the strike zone -- tend to whiff frequently. But that strategy yields more walks, fewer double plays and more home runs.
New research from the Hardball Times illustrates the actual correlations between strikeouts and other events. As you can see below, batters who fan more get on base slightly less (OBP) but hit for more power (SLG, ISO), ground into fewer twin killings (GIDP) and have a slightly higher batting average when they do make contact (BABIP), presumably because they hit the ball harder. On balance it's a positive tradeoff; more whiffs correlate with better overall hitting (wOBA).
Obviously there's a limit to that relationship; if every batter struck out there would be no OBP, SLG, HR or scoring at all. And Major League baseball may have reached that tipping point. Scoring has declined more or less steadily during the seven years that strikeouts have risen.
All this may be premature -- a blip on the season's radar. But as part of a larger trend, it's probably not. And that means more Ks and fewer Rs the rest of the way. You've been warned.
"Seattle Mariners: Strikeout problem stalling offense"
"Where are all of the Johnny Cueto strikeouts coming from?"
"What's behind all those strikeouts for Joe Mauer?"
"Strikeouts galore for the 2014 Mets"
For the seventh consecutive year, the strikeout rate has risen in April, to more than one every five plate appearances. Roughly 16 batters whiff in an average nine-inning game.
Theorized reasons for this trend are myriad. Fastball velocity has risen over the years, from an average of 89.8 mph in 2008 to 91.4 mph this season, according to Beyond the Box Score. Chris Moran notes in this BTB article that 12 pitchers had averaged 94 mph in an April start last year. That number was 25 with half of April to go in 2014.
There are other factors as well. Batters are swinging more at balls outside the strike zone and less at pitches inside it. That may be due to improved catcher framing, which has become a subject of much more emphasis now that cameras are observing every pitch and recording the result. Analysis has discovered that catchers can alter a significant number of ball/strike calls in the course of a game because umps are more likely to call strikes on pitches caught by the catcher if he doesn't move to retrieve the throw.
From an aesthetic standpoint, most fans are not enamored of this development. Few people pay to see a lot of wind-making. From a strategic standpoint, it seems obvious that strikeouts are a negative event for the team at bat -- after all, they are outs. But in a more general sense, the evidence suggests that strikeouts are very necessary evils.
In fact, strikeouts are often a tradeoff. Batters who swing hard and wait for their pitch -- i.e., pass on pitches they don't like even if they're in the strike zone -- tend to whiff frequently. But that strategy yields more walks, fewer double plays and more home runs.
New research from the Hardball Times illustrates the actual correlations between strikeouts and other events. As you can see below, batters who fan more get on base slightly less (OBP) but hit for more power (SLG, ISO), ground into fewer twin killings (GIDP) and have a slightly higher batting average when they do make contact (BABIP), presumably because they hit the ball harder. On balance it's a positive tradeoff; more whiffs correlate with better overall hitting (wOBA).
| Individual K rate and offensive statistic regression analysis | |
|---|---|
| Stat | Correlation (R) |
| OBP | -0.07 |
| SLG | 0.19 |
| ISO | 0.40 |
| wOBA | 0.10 |
| GIDP | -0.22 |
| IFH | -0.27 |
| HR/FB | 0.53 |
| IFFB% | -0.16 |
| GB% | -0.28 |
| FB% | 0.31 |
| BABIP | 0.08 |
| BB% | 0.28 |
Obviously there's a limit to that relationship; if every batter struck out there would be no OBP, SLG, HR or scoring at all. And Major League baseball may have reached that tipping point. Scoring has declined more or less steadily during the seven years that strikeouts have risen.
All this may be premature -- a blip on the season's radar. But as part of a larger trend, it's probably not. And that means more Ks and fewer Rs the rest of the way. You've been warned.
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