28 February 2010

Olympics: The Anti-NHL

Apparently, you do have to hit Gary Bettman on the head with a sledge hammer more than a once for him to get it. While you were enjoying the thrilling ice hockey tournament at the 2010 Olympics, Bettman and his NHL cohorts were busy failing to learn the key lesson of the games: people are excited about hockey; it's the National Hockey League that bores them.

Bettman is currently dragging his feet with Sochi, Russia about taking a two-week hiatus in the NHL season for the 2014 Olympics because the Olympics haven't delivered the expected interest-bump to the NHL. This is like Nome, Alaska complaining that tourism didn't increase after an ad campaign for Honolulu.

Here's the painful truth that the lords of the NHL have managed to ignore for 20 years: the Olympic tournament is everything that the NHL is not. The Olympics presents a two-week tournament in which every game matters. It makes for terrific matches with everything on the line.

It's exactly the same in the National Hockey League -- in the sense that it's totally different. Thirty teams play 82 games each through the fall and winter in order to eliminate the most dreadful 14. Then they start all over again and have the remaining 16 teams play as many as another 28 more games in the spring to decide the champion. By the time some strapping Jacque is kissing Lord Stanley's cup, the world has gone to the beach and forgotten about games played on ice.

Instead of holding the players hostage, Commissioner Bettman should consider learning something from the Olympics. If he wants his league -- once the fourth major sport; now simply irrelevant -- to matter at all, he should shorten the season, slash the playoffs in half and crown a champ by tax day. In the short term, the league will lose revenue. But it will gain relevance, which is ultimately a lot more important. Maybe the NHL representatives from Canada can tell him about it while they kiss their gold medals.

Intriguing Teams of 2010, Part 1

Between now and Opening Day, I'll be peeling the onion on some of the more intriguing teams of this coming season. First on the docket is last year's AL West champs, the Anaheim Angels.

Both baseball prognosticators and Las Vegas are down on the Angels, who lost their ace, their super utility guy and their former superstar to free agency. The departure of John Lackey, Chone Figgins and to a much smaller degree Vladimir Guerrero, will hurt, as will the perceived ascendancy of AL West rivals in Seattle and Arlington. I've seen several projection systems with the Angels at 75-84 wins, a 13-22 game tumble from 2009. I wonder if it's really looking that bleak in Orange County.

First, owner Arte Moreno didn't take those snubs lying down. Anaheim let Figgins seek his fortune elsewhere in part because it has another super utility player, Macier Itzuris, who doesn't possess Figgins's pop, but hits a respectable .359/.434 spotting at second, third and short. The Angels also have confidence -- perhaps unwarranted -- in young cornerman Brandon Wood, whose career .192/.222/.313 balance sheet in 224 at bats belies a strong minor league portfolio. Wood projects to hit for power but not get on base much, with below average defense at the hot corner.

Every team in baseball could use a John Lackey, but the Angels' cupboard is hardly bare, especially if mid-season pickup Scott Kazmir can find a different dance partner than "arm trouble." With the addition of Joel Pineiro to spell Joe Saunders, Jered Weaver and post-injury Ervin Santana, the Halos seem to have a competitive rotation. Off-season signee Fernando Rodney gives them a second closer behind Brian Fuentes, and with Scott Shields as set-up man, the bullpen looks like an asset too. Pitching is fickle, bullpens doubly so, but you'd rather start the season with this contingent than what anyone else in the division can trot out, wouldn't you?

Manager Mike Scoscia will write the names of some castoffs and retreads in his daily starting lineup, including Bobby Abreu in rightfield and Hideki Matsui at DH. Abreu was a pleasant surprise at a bargain price last year, while Matsui, wracked by injuries, was the reverse for the Yankees. Abreu's unlikely to repeat, but Matsui will likely make up the difference. First baseman Kendry Morales's breakout 2009 season in which he mashed .306/.355/.569 with 34 dingers is probably a bit rich for expectations in 2010, but Howie Kendrick (.334/.444) above average at the keystone, Erick Aybar (.353/.423) inhabiting the median at short, Wood a question mark at third and slugger Mike Napoli (.350/.492) on the honor roll behind the plate combine for an above average infield. Torii Hunter, Bobby Abreu and Juan Riveira are a bit long in the tooth but otherwise sufficiently skilled in the outfield.

Many insiders dismiss the Angels as a 92-win team last year that outplayed their run scoring profile. Statheads have documented that the difference between runs scored and runs given up is a good predictor of a team's record. Teams whose records run way ahead of their profile tend to tail off, and vice versa. So, many experts are starting their analysis of the Angels on the premise that their true level of ability last year was 92 wins, and then subtracting from that because of the loss of Lackey, Figgins and Guerrero and the concomitant gains of Seattle and Texas.

Here are some reasons why the Angels, at least going into the season, look just as good to me as they did last year:
1. The possibility of a full year of Kazmir, plus Pineiro, plus Santana is healthy, plus Rodney.
2. Without a superstar, Anaheim appears weak to untrained eyes. But lacking a soft spot in the starting lineup is more valuable than you think. Not only does it provide no rest for the weary pitcher, it limits the pain if a key player gets hurt. (See Mets, NY; 2009.)
3. Mike Scoscia's teams have a habit of flummoxing the run scoring profile. Fugetaboudit. 
4. Guerrero was addition by subtraction, as I documented last October.
5. Moreno has a big bank account, inflated by the out-migration of high-priced talent. He'll find some shiny jewel on the mid-season free-agent bazaar that Seattle can't afford.

Predicting baseball team records before the season is a fool's errand. But a smart betting person is taking the over on the Angels. They still look to me like the team to beat in the AL West.

24 February 2010

Boog, Will You Marry Me?

I suspect this is somehow illegal, but it's done with love. This was a guest column for Baseball Prospectus.

Building a Better Broadcast

by Jon Sciambi
Jon Sciambi, who does play-by-play of Major League Baseball games for ESPN, has been kind enough to grace the Baseball Prospectus site with a guest column.

Let me tell you about an argument I had with Chipper Jones. Last year, I came across an interesting nugget on Fangraphs while doing pre-game prep: Besides Albert Pujols, Chipper sees the fewest first-pitch strikes in the majors.

Chipper is open-minded when discussing hitting, even when he disagrees, so I decided to present him this information prior to the game. He was really surprised. He didn't believe the facts, even though the numbers were inarguable. Or, more to the point, he believed in what he knew (and himself) more than my stupid, never-played-the-game facts.

Chipper was so surprised that he went around the clubhouse asking teammates, one by one, if they were surprised. None of them were. Everyone saw it but him, the guy with ostensibly the best view. Chipper has great eyes, obviously, and great belief in those eyes, but those eyes can also occasionally lie to even one of the best hitters in the game.

I went on to ask why he'd swing at so many first pitches when the numbers suggest it's not a great play. Chipper explained that the first pitch is often the only time he'll get a "heater" the entire at-bat. "OK," I say, "but clearly, mathematically, factually, you’re not getting a ton of strikes." We go round and round for a bit without concession on either side and eventually I go upstairs to broadcast the game.

Fast forward to the top of the first. San Diego’s Tim Stauffer on the mound. Chipper digs in… and takes a 91-mph fastball right down the middle. He steps out of the box, finds our broadcast booth with those great eyes and, well, here’s what follows:
Chipper Screen

Chipper Jones 1, Stats 0. But Chipper, sample size!

Will Carroll’s "Be Stupider" post got me thinking: How can the broadcast world do a better job of delivering sabermetrics to the masses? And, more importantly, how do we make it "illuminating" instead of "coma-inducing?" Additionally, how do I get Chipper to understand I'm not a moron?

Like Will, I’m "mathematically challenged" and find lots of BP, Fangraphs, Tango, etc., tough to digest. I am somewhat "tentative" to push SABR-type stuff on air because of the aforementioned coma potential. That's not an excuse, just reality. But it's also on me to do better. During my years doing Braves games, I had the good fortune of working with a crew that was open to new ideas. All our player stat lines included OBP (not earth-shattering) and the bulk of our graphics were presented in rate-stat form. But the thing that made it work was my broadcast partner, Joe Simpson. If I dug up a non-mainstream stat somewhere online, I'd say, "You know, Joe, I was looking at 'I live in my mom’s basement.com,' and I found this note on Javy Vazquez…" He would giggle and poke fun, but he would always listen. You know what else? He would change his mind sometimes. Joe is very old school. But he’s fun enough to spitball in one of the classrooms of that old school. What's the line from Mr. Baseball? "I bet you didn’t start playing baseball as a kid because you wanted to work?" That’s right, Magnum P.I., I just quoted Mr. Baseball.

So how do we make a better broadcast? It's gotta be fun. Entertaining. To us. Yes. But, by extension, to the audience.

What else? Well, it's as much about eliminating certain stats from the lexicon as it is about adding them. We need to slowly erase the "noise." Stop mentioning and graphically supporting with stats like RBI and wins because that stuff doesn't make people smarter.


Let's not forget "it's the search for objective knowledge about baseball." The goal is not unveiling newfangled stats; it's about getting people to understand basic ideas and concepts. To achieve that, we can't just slap stats up on the screen and explain them. Understanding has to come in the form of analysis. We have to use the stat and explain it. Sometimes it needs to be the PBP guy playing analyst and getting the color guy to react:

If Ryan Howard is up, I can talk about RBI and why dependent stats don't evaluate individual performance well; RBI aren’t what reflects Howard’s greatness, his SLG does. I can mention that Howard's massive RBI totals may be due to the fact that no player has hit with more total men on base than Howard since 1492 (I believe this is a fact but didn't feel like looking it up). Point is, there are dead people who could knock in 80 runs hitting fourth in that Phillies lineup. (OK, I probably wouldn't say that on-air.)

The metrics are getting so advanced that we're in danger of getting further away from the masses instead of closer. We, as broadcasters, have to find better and entertaining ways of explaining the math in bite-sized terms. Simplified, we need to explain that one of the problems with batting average, as opposed to slugging percentage, is that batting average values a single and a home run equally. We can't assume that's understood just because we understand it. And the only way it gets embedded is to keep beating the audience with it so that it becomes ingrained the way ERA eventually did, even though that once passed for advanced math. That, and we should all wear blue blazers with an emblem that reads, "OBP is life."

I also believe, as it relates to the masses, the PBP guys can’t move the analysis needle much. The masses will always find former players more credible, period, and the BP base needs to be more open to that—if the goal is indeed to inform the masses and not be "right."

The average fan wants the analysis from McCarver, not Buck. Joe Morgan may not be popular in these parts, but last year I worked a Tigers/Angels game with him in Anaheim. At one point, I mentioned UZR, UZR/150, and other defensive metrics. As we were going to commercial, Joe said that he'd like to talk about defensive metrics when we got back. What followed was a pretty straightforward, simple discussion about defensive metrics without disdain or dismissal on his part.

Look, there's still a ways to go. We need a former player to look into the camera and explain properly why this guy:
.250/.380/.475
is a better offensive player than this guy:
.300/.320/.475
We need to get to where the masses understand there is no choice. This isn't subjective. I evaluate offense with OBP and SLG while you like RBI and runs scored is not the same as "I like strawberry, and you like vanilla." It’s "strawberry is better than vanilla." More accurate and, therefore, more delicious. To be clear, I don't speak for ESPN here, just me, but I think we have a responsibility to inform correctly. If a majority of teams are using advanced metrics to inform decisions, then we should do some of the same in analyzing those decisions.

In 2008, Dick Cheney was informed that two-thirds of Americans thought the war in Iraq was not worth fighting. Cheney’s response? "So?" We need a little bit more of that 'tude. This isn’t to say I agree with his politics. Or the war. Why am I even going here? Eject!

I'd liken this task to how The New York Times operates. The Times places the stories it deems most important above the fold and to the right. The majority of other papers go with what they think we think are the most important. The goal is to be the Times. If we eliminate the noise of RBI, runs, etc., keep it basic and utilize the slash stats, I believe that, slowly, the desert masses will drink the sand. The BP base must understand: VORP, EqA, WAR, and Robert Parish are not walking through that door. Not for a while. But it can only help if the broadcasters are a team, too—in uniformity (together, I mean, not wearing those blazers) while patiently holding that door open.

21 February 2010

86 the 96!

Been spending a lot of the last two weeks avoiding exposure to Winter Olympics coverage.  I can't stomach the needless nationalism that dominates our view of the Olympica, as if the ability of some 19-year-old from Vermont to ski down a hill fast demonstrates U.S. superiority over Sweden.

This time of year, I'm focused on pitchers and catchers, of course, and college hoops. The NCAA tournament -- and its lead-up -- are a particularly exciting time if you come from places like Albany, NY and Charleston, S.C., rooting for hometown teams like College of Charleston, Siena, Coastal Carolina, Cornell, and, for no apparent reason, Indiana University-Purdue University-Indianapolis, commonly known as IUPUI, which is pronounced "Oo-wee-poo-wee."

Gaining steam these days in college basketball circles is a horrifying idea. Jim Boeheim, the under-appreciated Syracuse coach, has been lobbying for several years to vastly expand the NCAA tournament to 96 teams. Boeheim wants to turn college basketball into the NBA or NHL, which is to say, make it totally irrelevant.

From a coach's perspective, this makes perfect short-term sense. He loves his kids, they work hard, they are among the best in the world, and he wants them to have an opportunity to dance at the big ball. (This year, of course, this isn't an issue for the Orange, who are #1 seed contenders. But his squad has come up short in recent years.) And Boeheim has the ear of the movers and shakers of NCAA basketball. This is worrisome, because Boeheim's proposal would literally ruin the game.

Imagine if every team that now plays in the NIT were to join the NCAA. Entire BCS conferences would pass into the tournament. Yawn. Say goodbye to the winner-take-all excitement of most league tournaments. ZZZzzzz. It would suck the prestige out of earning a berth for mid-majors and small conferences. Really, how special is a tournament invitation when a quarter of all teams get one? From the fans' perspective, it would destroy the regular season, render many conference tournaments lame and add nothing to the NCAA tournament.

All this is an object lesson for Major League Baseball. It must resist the misguided and nearsighted forces hankering for expanded playoffs and keep the regular season meaningful. It must maintain the credibility of a playoff spot, which could be sorely tested even with the current alignment if the AL Central delivers four .500 teams this year. It must maintain its slim purchase on the remaining sliver of integrity connected to the pennant race.

Bud, beware the Boeheims! 86 the 96!

The End of Moneyball

I remember reading the seminal book Moneyball and wondering to myself, why is Billy Beane letting Michael Lewis spill all his secrets? Beane had created a juggernaut in Oakland from 1999-2006 with a payroll that could hide in CC Sabathia's shadow. He had done so by exploiting inefficiencies in the baseball marketplace.

Beane had determined that other teams were overvaluing batting average and paying little attention to on base percentage, so he signed unwanted walking machines like Matt Stairs for pennies on the dollar. 

He discovered that any decent pitcher with some moxie and reasonable righty-lefty splits could get three outs in the ninth, but that other GMs still drooled over saves. So he let his hard-throwing closer rack up saves, traded him for good young players, and then plugged in the next guy. Shampoo, rinse, repeat. 

Beane recognized that the on-field manager isn't a field general; he's a squad captain with good personal skills. So he told his manager, Art Howe, who to play and how much. When Howe sought genius money after leading the As to the playoffs, Beane let the Mets pay it and hired another middle manager.

He realized that the best predictor of a pitcher's future success was his college baseball aptitude, not his build, or his athleticism or the speed of his pitches or other mysterious elements.So he avoided drafting high school pitchers, who had a very high bust rate.

Beane knew that buying baseball players on the free market could sink a low-income franchise if they didn't pan out. At the same time, players' salaries are immune to free market forces in their first four years in the Majors, and then are still undervalued through arbitration in years 4-6. (On average, players can expect to earn 40% of their free market value through arbitration in year four, 60% in year five and 80% in year six.) So he milked the core of his team --Tim Hudson, Mark Mulder and Barry Zito -- until just before free agency, when he traded each of them for a shower of good, young, underpaid performers. This effort provided the A's with Rich Harden, Dan Haren, Joe Blanton and Justin Duchscherer, among others, while only Hudson of the original trio has come within an elephant's butt of delivering value to his new team.

Since Beane's success depended on suckering fellow GMs, why on earth would he let someone publish his strategies? The answer, it turns out, was that other teams were on to Oakland by 2003 and were eliminating those market inefficiencies. In fact, the A's shortly thereafter turned away from OBP and began stressing defense as the next undervalued commodity.

By 2007 or 2008, whatever market inefficiencies existed were difficult to find and hardly worth exploiting. Baseball fans and sportswriters may not accept the conclusions of new baseball research, but all 30 franchises have and they are toiling diligently to develop their own, proprietary insights. Billy Beane's big advantage is gone.

The result, in case you haven't noticed, is that the A's are simply a low-budget team with predictable results -- between 10 and 12 games below .500 each of the last three years. Even if they squeeze value out of players now, with their lowest-in-the-league $57 million payroll (the Yankees are somewhere around $210 million), getting a lot for their money still leaves them under .500. To wit: the A's signed Kevin Kouzmanoff to staff the hot corner this year for $3.1 million, roughly one-ninth of Alex Rodriguez's pay. If Kouz is three times as effective per dollar as ARod, he's still one-third the player.

Beane's strategy these days seems to be to wring value out of the last bastion of sabermetric research -- middle relief -- and to take calculated flyers on low-cost retreads and imports. The $10 million gamble on Ben Sheets is a prime example of that. Sheets has a golden arm, but has been healthy about as often as the Haitian economy. And so, the once vaunted Oakland sabermetric machine will present the good people of the East Bay with a roster including the likes of Coco Crisp, Kurt Suzuki, Rajai Davis and Jack Cust. No wonder Michael Lewis moved on to the thievery on Wall Street.

06 February 2010

Super Bowl Sidebar

Psst. Wanna make a quick buck? Bet on tomorrow's Stupid Bowl.

I don't know who's going to win or by how much. In fact, that's the point: no one does. That's why you should make my bet.

Have you ever listened to football analysts? They are pigskin encyclopedias. They are strategic savants. They can tell you about dime packages and zone blitzes and all manner of esoterica. But they are no better at predicting game results than a blind monkey with a three-sided coin. They are not only notoriously bad predictors of which teams will win and by how much, but even of the general flow of games.

It's not their fault. In the NFL, past results are not necessarily indicative of future returns. 

So why should the one game tomorrow be any different? The experts can parse this contest down to Reggie Bush's nose hairs, but then some third-string linebacker intercepts two passes. They can atomize the effects of Dwight Freeney's ankle injury, but then some guy you and I never heard of blocks a punt for a touchdown. The game, like the ball, is spheroidal and bounces in strange directions.

So the experts say these two prolific offenses will make the game a track meet and have bid the over/under to 57. I'm sure that's warranted based on the information available. But the only way that happens is if the experts are right, in spades, because that's a boatload of points.

So bet the under. In fact, put some money on under 49, which would yield two-to-one. I'm not guaranteeing you'll win, just that the odds favor you. The line is based on what the experts know, which is far less important than what they don't yet.
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